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Growth and development typically involve the creation of new economic activities.  New 
productive sectors develop, and old activities come to be performed in radically different 
ways.  Evidence from both economic history and economic development suggest that this 
process of structural change is central to increasing growth and raising standards of living 
(Rostow 1960; Hirshman 1958; Sokoloff 1986).  Indeed, many early development theories 
viewed development as a process of transformation from agriculture to manufacturing (Lewis 
1954).  Labor productivity is higher in the newly developing sectors, and the reallocation of 
labor also pulls up productivity in traditional sectors.   
Not much is known, however, about the likely pattern of structural change in future 
development.  What sorts of new activities will take place in the fast-growing countries of the 
21
st century?  Are there new “patterns of development”, analogous to those Chenery and 
others identified in the 1960s?  And most importantly, what factors are conducive to fostering 
these new activities at the microeconomic level? 
In this paper we explore some of the issues surrounding the development of new 
activities in low-income countries.  Our central thesis is that this process is frequently 
“lumpy”, manifesting itself in rapid growth of particular regions or sectors.  Spatial 
inequalities tend to increase during periods of rapid economic development.  At the sector 
level, many fast-growing cities, regions and countries have export specializations in a very 
narrow range of activities.  Recognition of these facts requires a reorientation of the analytical 
frameworks and empirical approaches that are used to investigate growth. 
We find it useful to divide the determinants of a location’s growth performance into 
two groups that we term “1
st advantage” and “2
nd advantage” (terminology adapted from 
economic geographers’ notions of first-nature and second-nature geographies).  The term “1
st 
advantage” refers to the conditions that need to be met to provide the environment in which  2
new activities can most profitably be developed.  The term “2
nd advantage” refers to the fact 
that many aspects of growth are self-reinforcing.  The lumpiness of the growth process 
suggests the presence of increasing returns so that a location’s advantage in an activity 
derives, in part, from the very fact that it has a presence in the activity.  It is the interaction of 
1
st and 2
nd advantages that yields the growth patterns we observe, and that makes it so 
difficult to pin down the causes of rapid economic growth.  Increasing returns and cumulative 
causation have featured in many analyses of economic development, from the development 
economists of the 1950s through to Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).  We think it 
important, however, to recognize that key aspects of returns to scale are often found at the 
micro level – within very narrow sectors of production or small districts of a city.  A 
microeconomics of growth is needed to capture these sectorally and spatially concentrated 
processes 
Cross-country comparisons, though useful in identifying some of the important 1
st 
advantages, cannot provide policy insights into what will drive growth in a particular location.  
Instead a bottom-up approach is required, where microeconomic studies are used to build up 
evidence base on what works in different countries, regions and sectors.  This empirical work 
is facilitated by increased availability of micro data.  Regional, city, firm and household data 
are now available for a wide range of countries.  The institutional context in which policies 
are implemented and accumulation decisions are made affects economic performance (see 
Djankov and others 2003; Rodrik 2003). This makes it natural to study single countries and 
makes it less clear what one learns from cross-country regressions where these factors cannot 
typically be controlled for.  Furthermore it is clear that the actors in development work are 
highly diverse.  Policy and institutional innovations are happening all the time and are being 
implemented by central government, local government, nongovernment organizations and 
local communities. Evaluating these innovations requires careful microeconomic work at the  3
subnational level.  
Our route for investigating these issues is to begin in section 2 with a selective 
overview of the facts concerning the growth of new productive activities in developing 
countries.  We then outline a framework of analysis that can be used to think about the 
determinants of structural change and growth, developing our 1
st and 2
nd advantage distinction 
(section 3).  Section 4 goes into more detail, outlining what we know about some of the key 
elements of 1
st and 2
nd advantage based on the available evidence. Section 5 turns to work on 
India, as an illustration of how our approach can be used to generate insights into the 
microeconomic determinants of structural change.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Aspects of Modern Economic Growth 
Much of the recent work on the determinants of growth has focussed on country aggregate 
growth performance. The most popular examples of this are cross-country growth regressions, 
typically regressing growth performance on a number of explanatory variables.  While these 
regressions reveal something of the importance of 1
st advantages, such as human capital, good 
policy and institutions, and open trade regimes, many of the results are not particularly robust 
(see Djankov and others 2003; Rodrik 2003).  Furthermore, they fail to capture some key 
aspects of modern economic growth.  An aggregate approach overlooks two of the most 
important aspects of the performance of many developing countries: the uneven performance 
of different regions within each country, and the different performance across sectors.  
 
Spatial Concentration 
For many countries development is associated with increasing spatial inequality.  The finding 
of rising spatial inequality during development dates back at least to Williamson (1965) and 
has been confirmed in many studies since (e.g. the studies of urban concentration by Shishido  4
and Wheaton 1982 and Henderson 1999).  This increase in spatial inequality often arises from 
spatial concentration in the development of manufacturing.  We see this most clearly in data 
for large countries.  In section 5, for example, we show that states in southern India have 
come to prominence in manufacturing.  In Mexico manufacturing has become highly 
concentrated in regions that border the US, and spatial variation in per capita incomes has 
increased dramatically since the mid 1980s (Cikurel 2002).  In China, Demurger and others 
(2002) chart increasing spatial inequalities in per capita GDP from the mid 1980s.  Coastal 
provinces experienced the greatest decline in the share of agriculture in employment and 
output, and the fastest growth of per capita income. 
The spatial concentration of new activities also occurs at a much finer level of 
disaggregation than suggested by the state or province level data above.  The polarization of 
activity in a number of “city regions” in Asia is documented by Aranya (2002).  Bangalore is 
a good example; the city is estimated to account for 25% of India’s software exports, with 
some 100,000 workers in the city producing 3% of India’s total exports. Within cities, we 
know that particular sectors frequently cluster in particular districts (see, for example, the 
study of India by Chakravorty and Lall 2003). 
Spatial concentration is most dramatically demonstrated by the role of urbanization, 
and of mega-cities, in development.  The number of cities in the world with a population of 
more than 1 million went from 115 in 1960 to 416 in 2000; for cities of more than 4 million, 
the increase was from 18 to 53; and for more than 12 million, from 1 to 11 (Henderson and 
Wang 2003).  Henderson (1999) finds that national urban concentration (the dominance of the 
largest city) rises with growth from low-income levels, peaks at low-middle levels (per capita 
1987 PPP income of around $2,500) and then declines.  This tells us that, despite the massive 
diseconomies associated with developing country mega-cities, there are even more powerful 
economies of scale making it worthwhile for firms to locate in these cities.  Urbanisation is  5
one of the clearest features of the development of manufacturing and service activity in 
developing countries, yet discussion of urbanisation is strangely absent from the economic 
analyses of growth and development. 
 
Sectoral concentration 
There is a substantial but rather old development economics literature on the changes in 
countries’ production structures typically associated with development, deriving from 
Chenery’s “normal” pattern of sectoral change (Chenery 1960; Chenery and Taylor 1968).  
Using a trade framework, the specialization of countries has been researched by a number of 
authors, for example Leamer (1984, 1987) and Schott (2003), who find “development paths” 
linking the structure of countries’ production to their factor endowments. 
These studies are, however, based on sector aggregate data, and seem to miss key 
aspects of modern specialisation.  What do we know about specialisation during development 
in the 21
st century?  Globalization has created the possibility of trade in new products and 
services, and of a much finer pattern of specialisation.  The impact of new technologies is 
perhaps best illustrated by the experience, already referred to, of India (and Bangalore in 
particular), which is able to export labor services embodied in information technology and 
services.  The finer pattern of specialisation arises with the growth of production networks.  
Component parts and semi-finished goods can cross borders multiple times, and countries are 
able to engage in “vertical specialisation”, just producing one very narrowly defined part of 
the product.  Data on these activities can be hard to obtain, as they do not correspond to the 
standard commodity classifications of trade.  However, one of the fastest growing elements of 
world trade has been trade in parts and components, now accounting for around 30% of world 
trade in manufactures (Yeats 1998).   
A striking feature of growth has been the fact that many countries have done well in a  6
few extremely narrow product segments.  Once again, India’s success in software products is 
an example.  Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) look in detail at the exports to the US of 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Korea, and Taiwan, using data at the 
6-digit level (eg ‘hats and other headgear knitted or from textile material not in strips’).   Even 
at this very fine level of disaggregation, for each of these countries, their top four product 
lines account for more than 30% of exports to the US.  Furthermore, there is surprisingly little 
overlap in the top product lines of quite similar countries.   For example, Bangladesh is 
successful in exporting shirts, trousers and hats (but not bed linen or footballs), while Pakistan 
does well in bed linen and footballs.  Only six product lines are in the top 25 for both these 
countries. Hausmann and Rodrik conclude that ‘for all economies except possibly the most 
sophisticated, industrial success entails concentration in a relatively narrow range of high 
productivity activities’ (p26).   
These findings are not inconsistent with the broad pattern of ‘development paths’ 
identified by earlier researchers. However, they indicate that these paths are only part of the 
story.  Aggregate studies can conclude that a country has a comparative advantage in a labor-
intensive activity such as textiles, but provide no basis for predicting what particular product 
line will be produced.  To understand the economic success stories we must also know why it 
is that this spatial and sectoral concentration occurs.  
A corollary of spatial and sectoral concentration is that exports are essential; narrow 
sectoral specialisation can develop only if output is exported from the city, region or country.  
Increasing shares of exports in income are observed for many countries.  Between 1980-82 
and 1998-2000 the export to GDP ratio for the East Asia and Pacific region rose from 22% to 
41%, and for South Asia from 8% to 14%, (compared to, from 20% to 23% for the world as a 
whole, and 28% to 29% for Sub-Saharan Africa).
2   
                                                 
2  Averages for periods 1980-82 and 1998-2000, source World Development Indicators.   7
 
3. Analytical Framework:  1
st and 2
nd Advantages 
To understand the microeconomic determinants of growth we divide the driving factors into 
two sets, operating in distinct ways.  One set we label first advantage.  These are the factors 
that can be viewed as pre-conditions for the development of new activities; they are – loosely 
– necessary but not sufficient conditions for growth.  They include most of the factors that 
traditional theory has focussed on, such as access to inputs (labor skills and capital), access to 
markets, provision of basic infrastructure and institutional environment.  These factors shape 
the business environment in which firms make investment and location decisions.  The other 
group of factors we call second advantage.  Second advantage factors inherently have some 
element of increasing returns to scale, so may give rise to processes of cumulative causation.  
They are a function of the past and present level of activity in a location or sector and include 
factors such as technological capability, knowledge spillovers, thick market effects and 
networks.  For example, a particular city may be a good place to set up a business, precisely 
because of spillovers from existing similar businesses.  The increasing returns are typically 
sector and/or location specific, and are often external to the firm.  It is this combination of 
sector and location specific increasing returns to scale and external effects that gives rise to 
the lumpy performance described in the previous section.  
Before looking at the elements of 1
st and 2
nd advantage in detail, we spend the rest of 
this section outlining some theory on how they interact to shape the growth process.  To this 
end, we draw on work on sub-national inequalities (Venables 2003).  However, the rather 
broad lessons we draw have wider applicability, to international and intersectoral 
developments, as well as to sub-national ones (see for example Puga and Venables 1999 and 
Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999 for more fully developed models). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Differing levels across regions mainly reflect country size; it is the change through time that  8
Suppose that there are many potential locations in which a particular activity or set of 
activities could take place.  For our purposes a location can be thought of as a town or city, 
and the activity as a particular industrial sector, although alternative broader interpretations 
are also possible.  The private return to creating a job in this activity in location i is πi,  
πi = qia(ni) - (w(N) + ti) 
The first term on the right hand side of this expression is the value of output from the job. The 
first part, qi, measures the 1
st advantage of location i, capturing all aspects of the environment 
that, while specific to the location, are exogenous for the firms and sector under study.  We 
rank locations such that location 1 has the highest value of this term, location 2 the next 
highest, and so on.  An example of this might be, for an export activity, the distance of the 
location from the port, with more remote locations having worse 1
st advantage (a lower value 
of qi).  In the next section we offer a more complete view of the determinants of 1
st advantage.   
The second part is a function a(.) of the level of activity in location i, as measured by 
employment, ni.  This function measures 2
nd advantage, and we assume that it is increasing 
and concave, capturing increasing returns to scale that become progressively exhausted.  In 
contrast to 1
st advantage which is location specific, 2
nd advantage is represented by the same 
function at all locations, although the function is evaluated at location specific values of the 
endogenous variable, ni.  Thus, if one location has a higher employment level in the activity 
than another, then, because of increasing returns, it will also have a high value of a(ni) and 
higher output per worker.  2
nd advantage can originate from different mechanisms, including 
knowledge spillovers and the acquisition of technical know-how; the development of a dense 
network of local suppliers of specialist inputs to production; and the presence of thick local 
labor markets in particular sector specific skills.  We discuss these elements of 2
nd advantage 
in more detail in section 4. 
                                                                                                                                                        
we draw attention to.    9
The remaining term, w(N) + tni, is the cost of employing labor. w(N) is the opportunity 
cost of labor, i.e. its marginal product (and wage) in some alternative use.  This wage is a 
function of total industrial employment, N  ≡  Σi  ni, rising as workers are drawn out of 
agriculture into the new activities, w’(N) > 0.  tni is the cost-of-living in a city of size ni; this 
could be a congestion cost or, in the tradition of the urban economics literature, the rent plus 
commuting cost that urban workers to have to pay.  It is a source of diminishing returns, 
preventing all activity from concentrating in a single location. 
We are now in a position to address the following question.  Suppose that total 
modern sector employment, N = Σi ni, is exogenous and increasing through time.  As jobs are 
created they go to locations that offer the highest return (highest value of πi).  What form does 
growth take in this economy?  Equilibrium patterns of development are illustrated in Figures 
1 and 2.  The horizontal axis is total employment, N, so the economy moves to the right along 
this axis through time.  The vertical axis is employment in each location and the curves on the 
figure illustrate equilibrium employment in each location, ni.
3  
Figure 1 illustrates the case where there is no 2
nd advantage, so a(ni) is a constant, the 
same for all locations.  There is however 1
st advantage heterogeneity, and this maps in a 
continuous way into outcomes.  Better locations (those with low i, and hence high qi) get 
activity sooner and are larger than worse ones.  Thus, the curve n1 gives employment in the 
location with the best 1
st advantage, n2 in the second best, and so on.  Increasing N causes 
both intensive and extensive growth, enlarging existing locations and making it profitable for 
new locations to gain activity.  Figure 2 gives the equilibrium when 2
nd advantage returns to 
scale are present.  Development is much less continuous; once a particular location starts to 
attract activity, increasing returns cut in and lead to rapid growth.  Outcomes are determined 
by a combination of the 1
st advantage of each location, determining the sequencing, and the  10
2
nd advantage of increasing returns, determining the growth path of each location.
4 
We learn several things from comparison of Figures 1 and 2.  The first is that 
development, in the presence of 2
nd advantage, is uneven; locations do not develop in parallel 
but in sequence.  Second, development is more spatially concentrated.  For any value of total 
employment, N, activity is concentrated in fewer and (on average) larger locations.  Third, 1
st 
advantage determines the order of development and, at any point in time, predicts which 
locations are successful and which are not.  However, the dependence of performance on 1
st 
advantage is not continuous.  For locations just at the threshold of development small 
differences in 1
st advantage can translate into large differences in outcomes; if two locations 
have very similar 1
st advantage, then a small improvement could cause one to overtake the 
other, and gain industry sooner.  Conversely, for locations well below the current threshold an 
improvement in 1
st advantage does not confer any immediate payoff in terms of attracting the 
activity.  And amongst the set of active locations, differences in 1
st advantage have little effect 
on employment, as they are dominated by acquired 2
nd advantages. 
What about the efficiency of the equilibrium development pattern?  In the absence of 
2
nd advantage, the development path is efficient – there are no market failures in the simple 
structure we have outlined.  However, the presence of 2
nd advantage adds two distinct types of 
market failure.  Within existing locations, private agents do not take into account the fact that 
an expansion of employment raises the productivity of workers already in the city, meaning 
that private incentives to expand employment in the location are too small.  Additionally, 
there is a coordination failure involved in the development of new locations and activities.  In 
Figure 2 these are initiated when they become privately profitable for an individual small 
firm.  However, the profits from development of a new location or activity would be higher if 
                                                                                                                                                        
3  The figures are generated from a simple numerical example, available on request. 
4  The main point is the rapid growth of new locations; the jagged saw-tooth effect occurs as 
some workers are drawn from existing locations, and is not central to the argument.  11
firms could coordinate their decisions and act collectively.  These two market failures 
combine to have two effects.  One is that there is a tendency for cities to be too large, because 
of the difficulty of initiating activities in new locations.  The other is that the overall return to 
job creation, πi, is too small.  If the rate of growth of jobs depends on πi, then employment 
growth is less than optimal.  In an extension of the present model it is possible that there are 
multiple equilibria, and countries can become stuck in a low-level equilibrium.  Essentially, 
the slower is employment growth the worse is the coordination failure (as a new city only 
achieves increasing returns relatively slowly); but a worse coordination failure means lower 
return to job creation and hence slower employment growth.  Thus 2
nd advantage at the local 
level causes cumulative causation at the aggregate national level. 
Summing up, the theory tells us that the combination of 1
st and 2
nd advantage offers an 
explanation of the lumpiness of development.  It says that both advantages need to be 
considered together – changes in 1
st advantage alone do not necessarily translate into changes 
in outcomes.  And it says that there is market failure, and hence potential scope for policy.  Of 
course, the form any such policy should take depends on the detailed ingredients of 1
st and 2
nd 
advantage, and it is to enumerating these that we now turn. 
. 
4. A Microeconomic Agenda for Growth 
In this section we confront our analytical framework with some evidence on the drivers of 
growth. This allows us to begin to sketch out a microeconomic agenda for growth. We do not 
intend to be comprehensive, instead we focus on several areas including institutions, skills, 
technology, and trade.  We have several objectives.  One is to illustrate in each of these 
contexts the distinction between 1
st and 2
nd advantages, and thereby make concrete the 
somewhat abstract discussion of the previous section.  Another is to provide evidence for 
some of the increasing returns mechanisms, and give a sense of their importance.  This  12
section also points to the sort of detailed microeconomic information that is needed by policy 
makers in order to encourage growth within a narrow geographical jurisdiction.  We develop 
this theme further in section 5, with examples of policies that have affected the pattern of 
manufacturing growth across Indian states and industries.  
 
Property Rights and Contracts 
Strengthening of economic institutions is often seen as critical to promoting innovation, 
investment and growth (North 1990; Aghion and Howitt 2003).  Recent cross-country papers 
provide evidence in this direction.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) find that 
insecure property rights are associated with lower income per capita.  Hall and Jones (1999) 
show that a social infrastructure variable (which captures both the quality of government 
institutions and openness to trade) is positively associated with income per capita.  How to 
map from these findings into concrete policy suggestions, however, is not clear. 
Here microeconomic evaluation is pointing the way. For a given location we want to 
understand which elements of the property rights regime are central to engendering 
innovation and growth. Strengthening property rights over land appears to be an important 
element of 1
st advantage.  For example, the 1978 rural reforms in China, which entailed a shift 
from collective to household farming, are credited with engendering increases in agricultural 
productivity (Lin 1992) and an explosion in town and village enterprises which have been the 
engine of growth in China up to the mid-1990s (Qian 2003).  In a similar vein, Banerjee, 
Gertler and Ghatak (2002) show that a government program which increased tenurial security 
in West Bengal had a large positive effect on agricultural productivity.  Field (2002) finds that 
issuance of property titles to urban households in Peru led to an increase in labor hours and a 
shift in labor supply from work at home to work in the outside market. Besley and Burgess 
(2000) find that land reform acts passed in Indian states account for about ten percent of the  13
overall fall in poverty across the 1958-1992 period. 
Effective institutions for enforcement of contracts are another source of 1
st advantage.  
Djankov and others (2002) examine court procedures to evict a tenant or to collect a bounced 
check in 109 countries.  They find that common law countries exhibit greater procedural 
formalism which is associated with slower judicial proceedings, more corruption, less 
consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice.  
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002a) surveyed small manufacturing firms in Russia, 
Ukraine, Poland and Romania, and found that perceived effectiveness of courts in resolving 
commercial disputes affected the propensity of entrepreneurs to reinvest profits.  Well 
functioning courts also encouraged entrepreneurs to form new trading relationships with 
customers and suppliers (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002b).  Besley and Burgess 
(2003a) find that long backlogs in state high courts in India are associated with lower output 
in informal sectors where contract enforcement problems may be acute.  
Where laws of contract are inadequate informal relationships such as business 
networks may substitute for courts in allowing deals to be made.  Development of these 
networks is typically fostered by proximity and by frequency of interaction.  This is a 2
nd 
advantage.  A locality with a tightly knit business sector develops this advantage, helping to 
explain why new economic activities tend to be clustered.  For example, McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999) use the amount of trade credit extended by small manufacturing firms to 
suppliers and customers in Vietnam as a measure of business trust.  They find that 
relationships of longer duration, visits to premises and being part of the same business 
network all enhanced the propensity to extend trade credit.  They argue that relational 
contracting within business networks has enabled manufacturing to flourish in Vietnam even 
in the absence of formal institutions. Formal institutions to support finance and contracting, 
however, will be required as firms grow (McMillan and Woodruff 2002).  14
  
Regulation 
A second major element of 1
st advantage concerns the degree to which government regulation 
impedes entrepreneurship and the emergence of new activities.  Economic theories which saw 
the state as playing a central role in directing and coordinating economic development led to a 
huge variety of regulations being put in place. However, there is increasing empirical 
evidence that (well-intentioned as the architects of regulation may have been), regulation has 
been neither an engine of economic development nor a boon for the poor. 
One problem is that government regulations can be exploited to expropriate 
entrepreneurs.  Surveys of start-up firms, for example, reveal that more than 90% of Russian 
managers had to make “extralegal” payments to secure government services or a business 
license (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002a, 2002b).  Those firms who were most 
concerned about corruption invested 40% less than those who were least concerned.   
Government regulation of entry can also impede entrepreneurship and innovation. Djankov 
and others (2002) collect data on the time and number of procedures an entrepreneur must 
complete to officially open a business in 85 countries. They find pronounced variation across 
countries with the number of regulations to set up a business being larger in poorer countries.  
Heavy regulation of entry is associated with less democratic governments, greater corruption 
and larger unofficial economies. They argue that this is in line with a public choice view of 
regulation as being put in place by officials or insiders intent on extracting rents. 
Findings for labor regulation point in a similar direction.  Botero and others (2003) 
study labor regulations in 85 countries and find that heavier regulation of labor is associated 
with a larger unofficial economy, lower labor force participation and higher unemployment. 
Besley and Burgess (2002) find that pro-worker labor regulations in Indian states are 
associated with lower output, employment, investment and productivity in registered or  15
formal manufacturing but higher output in informal manufacturing (see section 5).  A survey 
of 1000 manufacturing establishments drawn from 10 Indian states revealed that managers 
would be willing to reduce their work force by 16-17 percent if there was greater labor market 
flexibility, this indicating the negative impact of labor regulation on firm productivity (Dollar, 
Iarossi and Mengistae 2001). 
Of course, there are a number of areas where government regulation is called for.  For 
example, in the area of finance, legal and regulatory institutions that protect investors and 
creditors from expropriation, are critical to engendering financial development.  Glaeser, 
Johnson and Shleifer (2001) argue that in Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by a 
highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market.  In 
contrast, in the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a moribund stock 
market.  La Porta and others (1998) find that common law countries provide investors and 
creditors with greater protection than do civil law countries, and this results in larger debt and 
equity markets (La Porta and others 1997) and faster economic growth (Levine 1998).  Given 
that external finance becomes increasingly important as firms grow, identifying the set of 
institutions which support financial development in a given location is critical. 
Nevertheless, it is frequently the case that removal of the impediments to 
entrepreneurship via regulatory change can be a powerful mechanism for attracting new firms 
to a location.  As employment in a location increases various types of 2
nd advantage kick in as 
a result.  Thicker markets imply better access to inputs and customers, skilled workers and 
external finance become more available, and firms benefit from technological upgrading.  The 
emergence of entrepreneurs as a powerful political class can also lead to demand for 
institutions which protect property and support contracting and finance.  Stern (2003) argues 
that improvements in the investment climate can be a powerful means of engendering 
increasing returns to scale along these different dimensions.   16
 
Education and Skills 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that investment in human capital is central to 
promoting innovation and growth (Aghion and Howitt 1998). The best estimates of the rate of 
return to education in developing countries (from micro-econometric studies that take 
endogeneity and measurement errors issues seriously) line up with those for developed 
countries -- each additional year of schooling is associated with a 6-10% increase in earnings. 
Duflo (2001), for example, uses a large primary school building project in Indonesia to 
establish that the economic returns to extra schooling provided via this program lie in this 
range.  This evidence appears robust across both methods and locations (Card 1999). After 
accounting for measurement error, the effects of changes in educational attainment on income 
growth in cross-country data are at least as great as microeconometric estimates (Krueger and 
Lindhal 2001). These results suggest that access to education is an important source of source 
of 1
st advantage in a location.  
This still leaves open the central question of how such an expansion in education is 
best achieved.  New work in the area is addressing this, looking at the market conditions 
under which it is provided and the incentives faced by education providers.  One strand of 
research focuses on policy design.  Banerjee and others (2003) have used randomized 
experiments to look at whether NGO implemented remedial education and computer assisted 
learning programs in India affected learning.  Randomized intervention has also been used in 
western Kenya to evaluate whether improving the quality of education by increasing the 
supply of textbooks and improving child health affect attendance and attainment (Glewwe, 
Kremer and Moulin 2000; Kremer and Miguel 2001).  Another strand focuses on whether 
there needs to be changes in the organization of policy delivery. Political representation, 
decentralization and involvement of non-government organizations and the private sector are  17
major issues here (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2001; Hsieh and Urquiola 2002).  
Educational levels raise the return to creating a job in a particular location, and are 
thus an element of 1
st advantage. The human capital embodied in skills that workers acquire 
while doing a job can also spillover to other firms, for example via job turnover.  A worker 
may become familiar with a particular technology and can use this knowledge in other firms.  
The magnitude of these spillovers will increase as the level of economic activity in a given 
location increases, and constitute a source of 2
nd advantage.  There are both micro-level and 
more aggregate studies of the importance of these effects.  Firm level studies are reviewed in 
Evenson and Westphal (1995) who find extensive evidence of learning by doing within firms 
and of spillovers between firms.  They also report that diffusion of technology between firms 
comes largely from the turnover of skilled workers and managers.  There is also evidence of 
human capital externalities whereby increasing the number of skilled workers in a location 
brings external benefits for other workers (Moretti 2003; Klien 2003). 
 
Trade and Market Access 
We have already argued (section 2) that exporting is an important aspect of modern economic 
growth.  Barriers to exports are, in our terminology, a source of 1
st disadvantage, reducing the 
return to job creation.  While this suggests the case for liberal trade policy, several caveats 
need to be made. Indeed, the role of trade policy in economic development has been the 
subject of an intense and passionate debate over the last decade.  
Our central thesis is that the mapping from 1
st advantages to outcomes is not 
straightforward.  The removal of trade barriers is not a sufficient condition for growth, as has 
been confirmed by the empirical literature.  While samples of successful countries indicate 
strong export performance (Dollar and Kray 2000, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1999), cross-
country regressions attempting to establish a causal link between open trade policy and  18
growth have failed to come up with robust findings (Rodrik and Rodriguez 2000). This is 
partly because of the complex interaction between 1
st and 2
nd advantages. Thus, some authors 
have argued that there are instances, especially in very poor economies, where liberalization 
is in fact detrimental to growth, by inhibiting infant industries and the local accumulation of 
knowledge (Krugman 1981, Hausmann and Rodrik 2002, Young 1991). Others emphasize 
that, in the presence of capital market imperfections, liberalization exacerbates income 
inequality within countries, imposing high costs on less favored regions, social groups or 
sectors of activity, and with ambiguous effects on average performance (see Banerjee and 
Newman 2003, Trefler and Zhu 2001). 
Once again, micro-based research is going to be more useful than broad-brush cross-
country work in informing the design of policy in particular countries. For example, Aghion 
and others show that technological capability and institutional conditions determine whether 
industries in India benefited from or were harmed by liberalization in 1991 (see section 5).  
Using Chilean plant level data Pavcnik (2002) find that import liberalization led to within 
plant productivity improvements.  Other recent work on firm level data from a number of 
countries has also drawn attention to the productivity gains from exporting (Hallward-
Driemeier and others 2002).  Detailed studies of the impact of trade reform on poverty have 
been undertaken by McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2002). 
Geography, as well as trade policy, is an important determinant of access to markets in 
which to sell output and from which to source intermediate and capital goods.  Evidently, 
much of the success of the northern border region of Mexico is a direct consequence of its 
proximity to the US, and coastal regions of China do well because they are on the coast.  A 
number of studies have tried to quantify the importance of these geographical 1
st advantages.  
Gallup and Sachs (1999) regress national per capita income on four variables; a measure of 
the endowment of hydro-carbons, a dummy variable for the incidence of malaria, and two  19
measures of geography; internal geography, captured by the proportion of population within 
100 km of the coast, and external geography, as measured by shipping costs (the cif/fob 
ratio).  They find that these four variables account for 69% of the per capita variation in 
incomes across countries.  Frankel and Romer (1999) and Redding and Venables (2004) also 
show how geography based measures are important determinants of levels of per capita 
income. 
In this area, as with others, micro-economic detail is important.  The market access of 
a location depends on its infrastructure and the quality of internal and external transport links 
with which it is served.  Limao and Venables (2001) construct an index of infrastructure 
quality, and show how a deterioration of infrastructure from the median to the 75
th percentile 
raises transport costs by 12% and reduces trade volumes by 28%.  Effects are even greater for 
landlocked countries. Numerous studies of port quality point to the damaging effects of delay, 
be it due to capacity constraints or poor administration.  And in this area too, there are 2
nd 
advantage effects.  Both the cost of shipping and the frequency of service are subject to 
increasing returns to scale, reducing costs for ports with a high turnover. 
 
Thick Market Effects  
Thick market effects arise when increased volumes of trade in a particular market increase the 
efficiency with which the market operates.  A number of mechanisms give rise to such 
effects, including improved matching of buyers and sellers, reduced monopoly or monopsony 
power, and the development of specialist suppliers – a finer division of labor.  These effects 
are all fundamentally 2
nd advantages; increasing the scale of activity in a market creates 
benefits for other consumers, workers, or firms.   
These thick market effects are important in many markets.  In the supply of finance, 
we have already seen how trade credit can be extended more readily in tightly knit business  20
networks.  Thickening financial markets in a particular location enables external finance to 
become more available and less costly, allowing firms to expand in size and to upgrade the 
technologies they employ (Rajan and Zingales 1998).  This in turn leads to greater demand 
for financial services.  Complementary institutions like credit rating agencies and more 
specialized finance providers like venture capital firms often develop as economic activity in 
a location increases.   
In the labor market, the thick market effect is usually known as labor market pooling, 
operating in two ways.  One is that workers and firms are better able to match their specific 
skills and needs the thicker the market.  The other is that scale reduces the risk of there being 
excess supply or demand of specific skills (if, for example, there are firm specific shocks).  
This in turn makes it more worthwhile for workers to invest in skill.  Some evidence in 
support of these hypotheses is presented in Rosenthal and Strange (2003). 
Turning to the product market, firms generally derive benefit from being located close 
to markets for their output and to suppliers of intermediate inputs.  Such input-output linkages 
are a source of 2
nd advantage, as firms seek to locate close to other firms with which they are 
transacting.  Forward and backward linkages between these firms constitute a pecuniary 
externality which raises productivity in the sector/location concerned, and gives rise to 
clustering of activity.  Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) model this theoretically, and on 
the empirical side Holmes (1999) presents evidence of US firms locating to gain the benefits 
of proximity to input suppliers.  A good deal of case-study evidence points to the importance 
of dense networks of specialist suppliers.  For example, Hobday (1995) studies a number of 
situations in which initial multinational investments in developing East Asia created 
backward linkage effects to local suppliers.  Examples include computer keyboards, personal 
computers, sewing machines, athletic shoes, and bicycles in Taiwan.  The initial foreign 
investments created demand for local suppliers and improved their quality, productivity, and  21
product diversity.  Large numbers of local firms entered to supply components or assembly 
services to multinational firms.  This growth of component and other intermediate-goods 
supply and productivity in turn created a forward-linkage effect to the final-goods producers, 
drawing in more multinationals and domestically-owned firms.  There then followed a 
second-round backward-linkage effect and so forth.  In some cases (e.g, bicycles, computers) 
local firms eventually displaced the original multinational entrants. 
 
Technology and Productivity 
Success in a particular product line requires mastery of the technology.  This point is 
particularly emphasised in the work of Sutton (2002) who argues that to compete 
successfully, a firm must be within a relatively small window, defined by production costs 
and product quality.  Acquiring capability requires fixed outlays on R&D and related 
activities, so is associated with increasing returns to scale.  There may also be learning-by-
doing, amplifying such effects.  For Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) development of successful 
activities requires experimentation, with firms having to incur upfront expenditures to learn 
about the comparative costs of their location. 
Knowledge spillovers mean that productivity depends on the activities of others, and 
are a source of 2
nd advantage.  These spillovers are often sector and location specific.   
Hausmann and Rodrik (2002) argue that the results of experiments become public knowledge, 
but the knowledge revealed is specific to the activity/ location combination.  If knowledge 
spillovers occur through job turnover they are also likely to be spatially concentrated.  Sutton 
(2002) argues that knowledge is embodied in teams of workers, and that it is difficult to move 
an entire team between locations.  
The spatial dimension of these spillovers is confirmed by many studies establishing a 
positive relationship between spatial concentration and activity.  For example, for the US,  22
Ciccone and Hall (1996) find, from work on US states, that doubling employment density 
raises labor productivity by 6%.  A recent survey by Rosenthal and Strange (2003) reports a 
consensus view that doubling city size increases productivity by around 3-8%.  Authors who 
have tried to find the spatial range of such effects find that information spillovers attenuate 
rapidly over space (for example Jaffe and others 1993).  Face-to-face communications remain 
important, despite technological changes (Gasper and Glaeser 1998).  
As for the sectoral spread of spillovers, there is a long-standing debate in the 
economic geography literature between the relative importance of ‘Jacob’s externalities’ and 
‘Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities’.  The former derive from the diversity of a 
city, the argument being that innovation and creativity are stimulated by serendipitous 
interaction in a large and diverse economic environment, such as New York City.  By 
contrast, MAR externalities are knowledge spillovers within narrowly defined sectors, as 
information on how to produce is transmitted from firm to firm.  Detailed empirical studies of 
productivity spillovers in developing countries confirm the importance of MAR externalities.  
The positive dependence of productivity on employment levels in the same city and industry 
has been found by studies for a number of countries (e.g. for the US and Brazil, Henderson 
1988; Indonesia, Henderson and Kuncoro 1996; and Korea, Henderson Lee and Lee 2001). 
We should note that acquisition and spread of knowledge are important in selling as 
well as in production.  Roberts and Tybout (1997) establish the importance of learning effects 
in firms export behaviour, and Evenett and Venables (2003), using a fine commodity and 
geographical disaggregation, show that learning to export also has a destination specific 
component.  
 
5. Structural Change in India 
One key objective of this paper is to argue that evidence building at the microeconomic level  23
should form the basis of policy formulation on what drives structural change and growth. In 
this section we focus on one country, India, to illustrate this process in action. Our evidence 
base remains incomplete. Nonetheless the work we describe illustrates how microeconomic 
analysis at the sub-national level is beginning to provide the detail on what is important at the 
local level. It is this detail, which is directly useful to policy makers.  
   The basic pattern of structural change in India is shown in Figure 3 where we graph 
real agricultural and non-agricultural output per capita over the 1960-1997 period for the 16 
main states of India. Agricultural output per capita remained relatively flat over the period. 
Economic growth was driven in large part by the rise in non-agricultural output. In 1960 
average real state non-agricultural and agricultural output per capita were of similar 
magnitudes at Rs. 406 and Rs. 425 respectively. By 1997, non-agricultural output at Rs. 2,814 
was more than double agricultural output (Rs. 1,266).  The pattern of markedly different 
across states.  A similar picture emerges in Figure 4 when we examine manufacturing, which 
is often seen as the engine of structural change.
5 Certain states -- Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra -- show rapid growth in registered 
and unregistered manufacturing, while states like Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, 
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal display relative stagnation (albeit from different base levels).   
And these differences in economic performance have profound consequences for 
welfare. India is unusual amongst developing countries in having carried out household 
expenditure surveys on a regular basis since the 1950s which allows consistent and 
comparable poverty series to be constructed (see Ozler, Datt and Ravallion, 1996).  In Figure 
5 we graph rural and urban poverty headcounts (which capture the percentage of the rural and 
urban population in poverty) for the 16 main Indian states across the 1958-2000 period. 
                                                 
5 Manufacturing in India is divided into a registered or organized sector (which is regulated, 
and covers firms with employment levels above 10 with electricity and above 20 without) and 
an unregistered or unorganised sector (which covers firms below these thresholds).  24
Comparing Figures 3, 4 and 5 what is striking is that states which experienced rapid structural 
change also experienced faster rural and urban poverty reduction. In short, structural change 
and growth appear to matter for poverty reduction.
6 Simple regression analysis helps to bring 
this point home. In Table 1 we show regressions of poverty measures on output per capita 
measures using panel data on the 16 main Indian states for the 1958-2000 period. Column (1) 
shows that increases in the levels of non-agricultural output are associated with significant 
falls in overall poverty.  In contrast, changes in agricultural output do not affect poverty. We 
find a similar pattern when we break poverty into its urban and rural components in columns 
(2) and (3) – it is the growth of non-agricultural output which is exerting a significant effect 
on urban and rural poverty. In columns (4) and (5) we look at the influence of registered and 
unregistered manufacturing.
7 In column (4) we see that increases in per capita registered 
manufacturing output reduce urban but not rural poverty. This makes sense, as these larger 
firms are located mainly in urban areas. In contrast, increases in output from firms in the 
unregistered manufacturing sector is significantly negatively associated with rural poverty but 
not urban poverty (see column (5)). The entry and growth of small businesses is important for 
explaining the pattern of rural poverty reduction.  
We have established that structural change matters for economic growth and poverty 
reduction in India. We now turn to the question of which institutions and policies account for 
different rates of structural change across Indian states.  We focus, in particular, on 
manufacturing. The fact that states, within a centrally planned economy, performed so 
differently in terms manufacturing is striking (see Figure 4). Much of the literature so far has 
                                                 
6 Using Indian state level data Ravallion and Datt (1996) have established a robust link 
between income growth and poverty reduction. They find that the elasticity of the incidence 
of poverty with respect to net domestic product per capita was –0.75 for the period 1958-
1991. This figure is close to the elasticity of –0.76 which Besley and Burgess (2003b) find 
using cross-country data for developing economies. 
7 Over the period the registered sector makes up about 9 percent of state output and the 
unregistered sector 5 percent.  25
focused on whether the Indian industrial strategy, which involved extensive use of industrial 
licensing and tariff and non-tariff barriers, led Indian manufacturing to perform poorly 
relative to other countries in particular those in East Asia (Bhagwati and Desai 1970, and 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975).
8 Nationwide policies, however, have limited scope to explain 
the marked cross-state variation in manufacturing performance that we observe in Figure 4.  
To understand these patterns we need to focus on state specific policies and 
conditions. We examine three examples of research on how 1
st advantage factors and the 
interplay between 1
st advantage and 2
nd advantage factors determine the pattern of 
manufacturing growth in India. These examples illustrate how the framework we have 
developed can be used build up a microeconomic evidence base on what matters.   
 
Example [1]: 1
st advantage: labor regulation and registered manufacturing 
Labor regulations have been identified as an important element of the investment climate in 
India (Stern, 2001; Dollar, Iarossi and Mengitsae, 2001, Sachs et al, 1999).  Besley and 
Burgess (2002) examine whether labor regulation is an important source of 1
st advantage 
which could help explain differences in manufacturing performance across Indian states. To 
do this they exploit two key facts: (i) labor regulations only apply to firms in the registered 
manufacturing sector, and (ii) the Indian constitution empowers state governments to amend 
central legislation. The main piece of central legislation is the Industrial Disputes Act of 
1947. This Act has been extensively amended by state governments during the post-
Independence period. Besley and Burgess (2002) read the text of each amendment and coded 
each as pro-worker (+1), neutral (0) or pro-employer (-1). The pattern of change across Indian 
                                                 
8 Between 1960 and 1995, manufacturing as a share of GDP grew from 9 percent to 24 
percent of GDP in Indonesia, 8 percent to 26 percent in Malaysia and 12.5 percent to 28 
percent in Thailand. In contrast, manufacturing output in India constituted 13 percent of GDP 
in 1960  but grew to only 18 percent of GDP by 1995. Source: World Development. 
Indicators.  26
states is shown in Figure 6 where it is apparent that the direction of regulation varies across 
states and time.  
Besley and Burgess (2002) then check whether the pattern of regulatory changes 
shown in Figure 6 affects the pattern of manufacturing development shown in Figure 4.   
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that moving in a pro-worker direction is associated with lower 
per capita manufacturing output levels. This effect is accounted for by the fact that pro-
worker labor regulation led to less output in registered manufacturing (column (2)). 
Investment in this sector is lower in states with more pro-worker labor regulation. Column (3) 
shows that the effect goes the other way for unregistered manufacturing. That is, states with 
more pro-worker labor regulations tend to have larger informal manufacturing sectors. This 
makes sense as where workers are able to extract more of the rents from production in 
registered sector, capitalists will prefer to remain in the unregistered sector where labor has no 
power. In columns (4) and (5) we see that regulating in a pro-worker direction is also 
associated with increases in urban poverty but does not affect rural poverty.  This reflects the 
fact that the adverse effects of labor regulation are mainly being felt in the registered sector 
which is found primarily in urban areas. These results suggest that attempts to redress the 
balance of power between capital and labor can end up hurting the poor. 
As Besley and Burgess (2002) show, the policy choices of state governments in India 
as regards labor regulation have strongly affected manufacturing performance. 1
st advantage 
factors like regulation which are, in part, under the control of sub-national governments will 
have a strong bearing on whether or not manufacturing develops in areas under their 
jurisdiction. And this in turn will have welfare consequences for citizens in those regions. It is 
important to note that the large differences in manufacturing performance were present well 
before liberalization in 1991.
9 This suggests that countries or regions wishing to develop 
                                                 
9 Besley and Burgess (2002) restrict their econometric analysis to the 1958-1992 period in  27
manufacturing must pay attention to the 1
st advantage factors which affect the business 
climate which firms face and not only to the trade regime. The institutional environment 
affects the investment and location decisions that entrepreneurs make.   
 
Example [2]: 1
st advantage: rural banks and unregistered manufacturing 
Our focus this far has been on the registered manufacturing sector. The majority of 
individuals in low income countries, however, do not have the choice of working in a factory. 
This is particularly the case for residents in rural areas. For them the relevant choice might be 
between remaining in agriculture or starting a small business.  These new activities are 
typically more productive than basic agriculture and thus encourage both growth and poverty 
reduction. Understanding which factors drive structural change by facilitating the emergence 
of small businesses is a key challenge.  
Burgess and Pande (2003) try to make some inroads into this issue by evaluating 
whether a massive rural bank branch expansion program in India affected structural change 
and growth in India. Over the 1961-2000 period more than 30,000 new branches were opened 
in rural areas. The rationale for the program was simple. The government identified lack of 
access to finance as a key reason why growth was stagnant and poverty persistent in rural 
areas.  The failure of banks to enter rural areas was seen as a brake on entrepreneurship and 
the emergence of new activities. To address this, the Indian central bank first nationalized 
commercial banks in 1969 and then imposed a license rule in 1977 which stated that for each 
branch opened in a banked location (typically urban) banks had to open four branches in 
unbanked locations (typically rural). This rule was removed in 1990 and branch building in 
rural areas came to a halt. As a result of the imposition of the 1:4 rule, states which had fewer 
banks per capita before the program in 1961 received more bank branches between 1977 and 
                                                                                                                                                        
order to better identify the impact of domestic state level policies.   28
1990 leading to both a reduction and an equalization in population per bank branch. 
Entrepreneurs, small businessmen and agriculturalists were explicitly targeted in the 
mandated lending practices of banks.  The program is an example of government targeting a 
key 1
st advantage factor, access to capital, as a means of encouraging the spread of new 
economic activities across rural India.  
To evaluate the program Burgess and Pande (2003) use these 1977 and 1990 trend 
breaks in the relationship between initial financial development and rural branch expansion 
attributable to license regime shifts as instruments for the number of branches opened in the 
rural unbanked locations. Some results are contained in Table 3.  In column (1) we see that 
rural branch expansion is associated with higher output per capita. This was due to rural 
branch expansion driving up non-agricultural output.  Agricultural output, in contrast, was 
unaffected.  Columns (2) and (3) show that the impact on manufacturing was felt mainly in 
the unregistered sector.  Column (3) suggests that the arrival of banks in rural areas helped 
people to start and expand small businesses. By addressing a key 1
st advantage factor the 
(albeit forced) entry of banks is seen to have been a spur for entrepreneurship and structural 
change. In contrast, registered manufacturing which is located mainly in urban areas was 
unaffected (column (2)). In column (4) we see that the structural change engendered by rural 
branch expansion had positive consequences in terms of reducing rural poverty.  Urban 
poverty, in contrast, is unaffected (column (5)).  
This example brings home how a 1
st advantage factor, access to finance, may be 
critical in enabling poor, rural residents to begin new economic activities. The arrival of rural 
banks in rural India enabled people to take on new production and employment activities and 
to exit poverty. The results highlight how important access to finance is for encouraging 
entrepreneurship, structural change and growth.  
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Example [3]: interplay between 1
st and 2
nd advantage: technological capability and trade 
liberalization  
But how do 2
nd advantage factors which are intrinsic to firms and industries interact with 1
st 
advantage factors which affect the environment in which firms function? We have argued that 
it is the interplay of factors which is critical to understanding modern economic growth. Such 
interactions are difficult to study empirically as 2
nd advantage factors are themselves 
endogenous.   
One way in which we can get some purchase on this issue is to look at how the 
technological capability of firms or industries affects how they respond to a liberalization 
shock. That is, in line with the theory in section 3 – we might expect firms in the same 
industry to respond differently to the threat of entry depending on how competitive they are 
with the new firms and products. How firms respond will in part depend on the technological 
choices they have made in the past. Firms that are close to the technological frontier are in a 
better position to compete with new firms and products.  They may respond by investing in 
new technology to retain existing markets and to benefit from increased access to new 
markets. In contrast, investment incentives in laggard firms are likely to be blunted and these 
firms are likely to be harmed by liberalization. This makes it clear that the responses we see 
to the same liberalization shock are likely to be heterogeneous across geography and within 
sectors. Heterogeneity in post-reform performance is also likely to be magnified if the 
institutional environment in which firms are located varies. That is we can think of 
interactions between market access and other 1
st advantage factors leading to differential 
performance in two firms which are have identical technological capabilities.    
To look at this issue of interplay between 1
st and 2
nd advantage factors Aghion and 
others (2003) exploit the fact that India experienced a massive trade liberalization in 1991. 
This shock was common across firms in the same industry. However, firms in different states   30
in the same 3-digit industry varied in terms of their level of pre-reform productivity which can 
be taken as proxy of technological capability. On dimensions such as labor regulation, the 
institutional environment in which firms function also varied across Indian states as we 
studied above.  
In Table 4 we report how interactions between the liberalization reform (captured by a 
dummy variable which switches on in 1991), pre-reform technological capability (captured by 
the ratio of labor productivity in a 3-digit state-industry relative to the most productive state 
industry in India) and pre-reform state-level investment climate (captured by the labor 
regulation measure) affected performance in the registered manufacturing sector in India. We 
look at these relationships using a panel of 3-digit state-industries for the period 1980-1997. 
In the first row of Table 4 we see that state-industries with higher pre-reform technological 
capability (ie, closer to the Indian productivity frontier for that industry) saw greater increases 
in output, employment, labor productivity and total factor productivity post-reform. This 
shows that state-industries with greater technological capability benefited more from 
liberalization. In contrast, laggard state industries which were below median productivity for 
India experienced below trend rates of increase in output, employment, labor productivity and 
total factor productivity following liberalization in 1991.  Manufacturing performance is 
therefore a function of the interplay between a 1
st advantage factor (market access) and a 2
nd 
advantage factor (technological capability).  
In the second row of Table 4 we observe, in line with the results presented in Table 2, 
that state-industries located in states with more pro-worker labor regulation saw less growth 
in output, employment, labor productivity and total factor productivity for the 1980-1997 
period. This makes it clear that institutional environment (as captured by 1
st advantage factors 
such as labor regulation) in which 3-digit industries function affects how well they perform.  
Moreover in the third row of Table 4, where we report results for the interaction  31
between labor regulation and liberalization, we observe that the negative impact of pro-
worker regulation is magnified in post liberalization period. That is it is even more damaging 
in terms of output, employment, labor productivity and total factor productivity growth for 
state-industries to be located in a pro-worker state when market access is increased. These 
findings from Aghion and others (2003) emphasize that the initial level of technology and 
institutional context mattered for whether and to what extent industries and states in India 
benefited from liberalization. 
These findings have interesting implications for policy. First, in line with the theory 
outlined in section 3 it is clear that the level of productivity pre-reform matters for the post 
liberalization trajectory. The key importance of the interplay between 1
st advantage and 2
nd 
advantage factors has a critical bearing on the pattern of post liberalization growth. This of 
course begs the question of why levels of productivity were different in different 3-digit 
industries in different states in the first place. That is beyond the scope of the analysis 
however it does point to the understanding what determines the industrial capabilities of firms 
as being a central area of research (see Sutton, 2002).  Second, the institutional environment 
affects the extent to which liberalization will be growth-enhancing. For instance, rigidities in 
the labor market may limit the positive impact of trade liberalization. The institutional and 
policy choices that state governments make have a central bearing on the extent to which the 
regions they govern will benefit or not from liberalization.  Third, liberalization may have 
adverse effects on industries and regions that are initially less developed. This may call for 
complementary measures to offset the negative distributional consequences of reforms, e.g., 
investment in infrastructure and support for knowledge acquisition in backward areas. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Establishing the factors that drive structural growth has always been central to development  32
economics. As growth theory has developed and disaggregated data have become available, 
this work has been moving in a microeconomic direction. Some broad correlations are 
emerging in new cross-country work that tries to explain the very different growth 
experiences of countries. These serve as useful signposts for more detailed microeconomic 
work though we are at an early stage in that process.  For example, though there may be some 
consensus that access to finance matters for entrepreneurs, it is unclear how such access 
should be provided (e.g. private banks, development banks, microfinance). And what is 
appropriate may depend on the type of business and how developed the legal system and 
other institutions are.  
The microeconomic approach described in this paper represents the frontier for 
identifying the 1
st advantage pre-conditions for growth. This approach based on careful 
building of microeconomic evidence has become standard in developed economies and is 
now taking off in research on low-income countries.  There is a growing consensus that 
evidence building via evaluation of policy and institutional reforms represents the best 
approach for identifying what works. The 1
st advantage examples we provide from India 
illustrate this process at work.  
But, as this paper makes plain, identifying sources of 1
st advantage is not the whole 
story. The spatial/sectoral pattern of modern economic growth suggests that it is the result of 
a complex interaction of 1
st advantage factors and what we call 2
nd advantage factors. These 
factors, which include technological capabilities, technological spillovers, market linkages 
and networks, are the results of investment and location decisions made by entrepreneurs.  
The externalities that they create shapes future growth.  As the example from India brings out, 
it is the interaction between 1
st advantage and 2
nd advantages which determine where and in 
which sectors growth takes place. This observation brings into sharp relief the fact that 
modern economic growth is the result of interactions between institutions and organizations.  33
Understanding the factors that drive the technological, investment and location decisions of 
firms is therefore central to understanding modern economic growth. These decisions will 
themselves be a function of institutions and other 1
st advantage factors that make the 
empirical study of growth challenging.  
Two key policy lessons emerge from our analysis. First, in the absence of 1
st 
advantage elements, rapid structural change and growth are unlikely to take place. Much 
recent work is therefore focussed on uncovering the microeconomic roots of backwardness. 
Second, ensuring that 1
st advantage elements are present is not a guarantee that rapid 
economic growth will take place in a given location.  Consideration of 2
nd advantage factors, 
at the microeconomic level, is thus central to understanding economic growth. And here our 
knowledge base is extremely thin.  
The paper constitutes a modest step toward understanding which factors drive growth 
at the microeconomic level. Given the strong links between innovation, growth and poverty 
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State effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2  0.83 0.88 0.79 0.89  0.79 
Observations 318  318  318  318  318 
 Absolute standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state. *significant 10% level, ** significant 5% level, 
***significant 1% level. Poverty headcount is the percentage of the population below the official Indian poverty lines which are separately 
defined for rural and urban areas. Agricultural, non-agricultural, registered and unregistered manufacturing output are in log real per capita 
terms. Sample is a panel of the 16 main Indian states for the period 1958-2000. Regressions only include years when NSS survey carried out. 
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State effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2  0.93 0.93 0.75 0.89 0.80 
Observations  509 508 509 547  547 
Source Besley and Burgess (2002). Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state. Absolute t statistics in parenthesis.*significant 10% level, 
** significant 5% level, ***significant 1% level. Registered and unregistered manufacturing output are in log real per capita terms. Poverty 
headcount is the percentage of the population below the official Indian poverty lines which are separately defined for rural and urban areas. 
State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over the period to 
generate the labor regulation measure. The data are for the sixteen main states for the period 1958 - 1992.   50
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State  effects  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  effects  YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R
2  0.94 0.94 0.81 0.75 0.92 
Observations  579 579 579 627 627 
 Source: Burgess and Pande (2003). Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state. Absolute t statistics in parenthesis. *significant 10% 
level, ** significant 5% level, ***significant 1% level. Registered and unregistered manufacturing output are in log real per capita terms. 
Poverty headcount is the percentage of the population below the official Indian poverty lines which are separately defined for rural and urban 
areas.  The number of branches in rural unbanked locations is normalized by 1961 population. The two instruments for this variable are the 
number of banked locations in 1961 per capita interacted with (i) an indicator variable which equals one if the year>1976 and a post 1976 
time trend (ii) an indicator variable which equals one if the year>1989 and a post 1989 time trend respectively.  Sample is a panel of the 16 
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Industry time trends  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
 R
2  0.94  0.96 0.94 0.64 
Observations  22883  22883 22883 22883 
 Source: Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2003). Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state-industry. Absolute t statistics in 
parenthesis. *significant 10% level, ** significant 5% level, ***significant 1% level. Pre-reform technological capability is pre-reform state-
industry labour productivity relative to the state with the highest level of pre-reform labour productivity within the industry. Reform is a 
dummy which equals 0 before 1990 and equals 1 from 1990 onwards. State amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act are coded 1=pro-
worker, 0=neutral, -1=pro-employer and then cumulated over the period to generate the labor regulation measure. Sample is a three 
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